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Historical reflections on progress and tradition. 
by 
R.C. van Caenegem 
At the time of writing I was watching the conflict in Egypt between the 
progressive, liberal movement and the sympathizers with the Muslim 
Brotherhood, who defended ancient traditions. I began to wonder whether 
Europe, in its long history, passed through similar convulsions, in a pattern 
which teaches us something. 
 
The nineteenth century 
The age of Queen Victoria immediately came to my mind because in her 
country public life was marked by the clash between progressives and 
traditionalists. The liberals and the conservatives even gave their names to the 
two dominating parties, which produced the best known Prime Ministers, 
Gladstone of the Liberal and Disraeli of the Conservative Party. The liberals 
stood for modernization and were critical of the monarchy and of religion, 
whereas their rivals were defenders of ancient traditions and closer to the throne 
and the Church. The supporters of the “good old times” managed, for example, 
to block attempts to reform the medieval House of Lords i. It was typical of this 
deep seated ideological conflict that, when the two precursors of the University 
of London were founded, University College and King’s College, the former, 
created in 1828, was to be a freethinking bastion, whereas the latter was an 
Anglican response given by traditional forces. 
Nineteenth-century Belgium was similarly divided between progressive, 
anticlerical liberals and traditional ultramontane Catholics. Their two parties, 
called the Liberal and the Catholic, ruled the country and fought each other 
vigorously. Their ideological battle came to a head with the so-called School 
War (1879-1884), when the Liberal government promoted “neutral” state 
schools in order to undermine traditional Catholic education. The confrontation 
was so bitter that teachers who accepted work in the “godless” schools were 
excommunicated. 
Just as happened in London and at the same time, the two ideologies founded 
their own universities to defend their principles, the Université Catholique de 
Louvain (linked to the medieval university abolished at the French Revolution) 
and the Université Libre de Bruxelles. 
The Belgian Revolution of 1830 was successful because of a temporary 
coalition of liberals and Catholics who were as one against King William of the 
United Netherlands ii. The liberals wished to topple him because he was too 
autocratic, and the Catholics found him too Enlightened and Protestant. 
However, as soon as the monarch was gone the two groups fell out. There is a 
striking similarity with events in present-day Egypt, where the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the liberals have been united against President Mubarak but 
started quarrelling as soon as he had left iii.  
Several other countries were confronted with  the same conflict, and there is no 
need to expatiate on it. It is, however, apposite to point out the moral support 
offered by the papacy to conservative interests in Catholic countries. Pope Pius 
IX roundly condemned such modern “errors” as popular sovereignty, 
constitutions and parliaments, human rights, equality, freedom of thought, of 
conscience and of religion. The full catalogue of these “errors” was published as 
an annex to the encyclical Quanta cura of 1864, known as the Syllabus errorum 
(the list of errors) iv. 
 
 
The eighteenth century 
In France the age of Voltaire and Diderot saw a clear divide between the 
traditionalist supporters of kingship and Church and the progressive believers in 
the Enlightenment of Diderot and d’Alembert’s Encyclopédie. 
The conservatives stood by absolute monarchy, the intellectual superiority of the 
Eglise gallicane and the privileges of the nobility (in 1789 all French bishops 
were noblemen). Their opponents believed in democracy and equality and 
followed human reason instead of religious dogma. 
The Etats Généraux, the French parliament, meeting in 1789 for the first time 
since 1614, gave the progressives their chance. They called themselves the 
National Assembly and introduced, following the English model, constitutional 
monarchy and government controlled by an elected assembly. The Assembly 
published the Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen and abolished 
feudalism, serfdom and class privilege. The French Church was nationalized and 
its landed wealth expropriated. The clergy was integrated into the State by the 
Constitution civile du clergé of 1790 and regarded as a public service. This 
straightforward tale of a progressive victory was typical of France, but not of 
Europe.  
In England, for example, following the Glorious Revolution of 1689, absolute 
kingship was no longer argued about, nor, following the Toleration Act of 1689 
and the abolition of censorship in 1695, was religious persecution a topic. 
In central Europe the situation was more complicated, as Enlightened rulers such 
as Frederik II of Prussia (a friend of Voltaire) and Joseph II of Austria pursued 
progressive politics for the wellbeing of their subjects. They issued modern 
codes of private law, humanized criminal law and abolished torture. Frederik  
favoured religious freedom, saying that “in his kingdom everyone could be 
saved in his own way”. 
Joseph II abolished “useless” contemplative orders, introduced compulsory 
schooling and issued a Patent of Toleration in favour of faiths other than the 
Catholic. He moreover, introduced civil marriage and divorce. Those emperors 
and kings did not, however, extend modernisation to the political sphere: they 
stuck to the tradition of personal rule, without constitutional curbs or 
parliamentary control. This mix of progress and tradition was rather strange, but 
even stranger were the events in France after the coup d’état of 1792.  
The first phase of the Revolution was moderate: the monarchy was saved, the 
Catholic faith respected and, as revolutions go, there had been little bloodshed. 
Things changed in August 1792, when the Revolution took a radical turn and the 
Convention Nationale, dominated by extremists, assumed full power. The 
monarchy was abolished, the republic proclaimed, the king and the queen 
executed and Christianity outlawed and replaced by the cult of the goddess 
Reason. A regime of terror was installed and political opponents and class 
enemies guillotined or otherwise put to death en masse. The Convention was the 
sole instrument of the State, parliament and government combined, and there 
was no President of the republic or head of State. 
Does this phase fit in my paradigm of progress versus tradition? If progress 
means democracy, liberty and the rule of law those fateful years obviously do 
not qualify. Nor, clearly was it in favour of tradition, for what the radicals aimed 
at was the destruction of the most hallowed traditions of the French nation, 
kingship and Christianity. 
So the question remains what to make of these fateful events. It is clear that a 
good idea could get out of hand and, when pushed relentlessly to extremes, lead 
to absurd and selfdefeating consequences. The radicals mercilessly forced their 
ideas on everyone. As a German poet said sarcastically: “Und willst du nicht 
mein Bruder sein, so schlag’ich dir den Schädel ein” (if you refuse to be my 
brother, I will bash your head in). 
A similar drama took place after the Russian October Revolution of 1917, when 
high hopes of a new dawn of freedom were dashed by Stalin’s terror. 
As the eighteenth century drew to a close, so did the French Revolution, when a 
general grabbed power and ruled as Premier Consul and then as Empereur des 
Français. 
 
The seventeenth century 
In the age of Galilei and Newton scientists achieved triumphs, but for democrats 
and liberals Europe was a dismal place. Absolute kings triumphed v - Magna 
Carta fell into oblivion and parliaments were ignored – and religious and other 
wars were endemic. 
In England, however, events did not completely follow this pattern and therefore 
deserve our special attention. The Stuart kings James I, who wrote learned 
treatises on kingship by divine right, and Charles I, who ruled without 
Parliament from 1628 to 1640, were autocratic monarchs in the continental 
fashion. For a long time they managed to keep the opposition at bay, both its 
political, who defended Parliament, and its religious wing, who were Puritans 
and strict Calvinists. But in 1640 the Scottish war led to the recall of Parliament 
and the anti-royalists grabbed their chance: the Puritan Revolution broke out and 
the country was dragged into a civil war between the royalists and their 
opponents. Finally the rebellion won the day, and its leader, Oliver Cromwell, 
proclaimed the Republic. The monarchy was abolished and King Charles 
executed in 1649. In 1646 the episcopal hierarchy of the State Church had been 
abolished (in 1645 Archbishop Laud, a thorn in the Puritan flesh, was executed). 
How are we to evaluate the short-lived Puritan Republic (the monarchy was 
restaured in 1660)? Toppling an autocratic king, proclaiming a republic and 
reviving Parliament were democratic achievements. The Republic professed to  
believe in Liberty: the new-born State called itself the “Commonwealth or Free 
State”, and on the Great Seal 1649 was called “the first year of freedom by 
God’s blessing restored”. The plan of codifying the law and the replacement of 
Law French vi by plain English were democratic steps. 
The exalted phrases about Freedom did not, however, mean that Cromwell was 
leading his people to a promised land of liberalism. On the contrary, he 
proceeded, as a true fundamentalist, to impose his own puritanical, rightenous 
and God-fearing way of life, including the death penalty for adultery and a ban 
on the theatre, as being too frivolous. Iconoclastic zealots destroyed or mutilated 
religious works of art: the stained-glass windows of King’s College Chapel in 
Cambridge avoided being smashed in the nick of time. So the Puritan 
Revolution managed to bring down autocratic kingship, only to replace it by an 
intolerant Cromwellian republic. The events in Iran in our own time were very 
similar: the Ayatollahs overthrew the autocratic regime of the Shah, only to 
replace it by their own oppressive Islamic Republic. 
 
The sixteenth century 
In the age of Erasmus, Luther and Calvin Europe was divided in a progressive 
and a traditional camp. The humanists, whose uncrowned king was Desiderius 
Erasmus, were a liberating force which broke free from the shackles of medieval 
scholasticism and broadened people’s outlook. They were at the dawn of a new 
age and wrote ironically about the credulity and superstition of their forefathers. 
In the first half of the fifteenth century the Italian humanist Lorenzo Valla 
demonstrated that the Donatio Constantina was a fake. It pretended to be a 
diploma in which Emperor Constantine the Great, upon moving the seat of his 
government from Rome to Constantinople, granted the pope the governance of 
the Occident, and had been fabricated in the eighth century vii. If it took some 
naievety to believe in Constantine’s grant, a set of spurious documents 
fabricated in Austria around the middle of the fourteenth century and known as 
the Privilegium maius, some of which pretended to be grants by Julius Caesar (!) 
and Emperor Nero (!) was even more farfetched. When the famous humanist 
Petrarca was consulted about its authenticity, he told the Austrians in 1361 that 
their precious privileges were the work of a falsifier described as an asellus 
importunissimus, a very uncouth donkey viii. The humanists also deepened the 
understanding of Antiquity and studied the three languages at the cradle of 
Western civilisation, Hebrew, Greek and Latin. Their critical ideas inspired such 
pathbreaking scientists as the astronomer Copernic and the anatomist Vesalius. 
Ideally the humanists hoped for a tolerant and peaceful European republic of 
letters. 
The Protestants were progressive, as they broke the domimation of the 
monolithic papal Church. They proclaimed everybody’s right to interpret Holy 
Writ, not constrained by the dictates of the hierarchy: freedom of conscience 
was encouraged.  
The Emperor Charles V was an imposing figure in the conservative camp. He 
stood for tradition and fought heresy in the criminal courts and on the battlefield. 
The Fathers of the Council of Trent were on the same wavelength: they were the 
voice of the Counterreformation and accentuated papal centralism. 
The two views crossed swords for most of the century. Viewing the ideological 
battlefield at its end, an observer would have found the sad spectacle of dashed 
hope. The humanists’ peaceful and tolerant republic of letters proved a forlorn   
pipedream in a fanatical age of wars and religious persecution. Luther’s idea of 
reforming the Church from within – the original meaning of the Reformation – 
in fact led to the breakup of the Roman Church the greatest legacy of the Middle 
Ages. Only parts of Germany, Scandinavia, parts of Poland and parts of 
Hungary followed the lead of the rebellious Augustinian monk. 
Calvin’s ambition to reconstruct the whole of Christendom was thwarted, as 
only Switzerland, Holland and Scotland joined in, while France, after a bloody 
civil war, remained in the papal camp. The conservatives were equally 
infortunate. Heresy proved ineradicable and the Roman Church had to live with 
the reality that large parts of Europe - the Lutheran and Calvinist countries as 
well as England – escaped papal control (Philip II’s ambition to conquer 
England and Holland for Catholicism failed).  
Not to end on a sombre note, I see one point of light: the growing freedom of 
thought. There now existed religious diversity and, though total freedom was 
still far away, people could – if they left in time – escape from coercion: Flemish 
Protestants fled to Queen Elizabeth’s England and her own Catholic subjects 
fled to Flanders to live their faith and study at Leuven or Douai or enter an 
English convent in Bruges, Ghent or Ypres. 
 
The fifteenth century 
My last case study concerns the constitution of the Church. About A.D. 1400 
Latin Christendom witnessed an attempt to make the general council the 
supreme authority instead of the papal curia – in modern terms to make the pope 
a constitutional head restricted by parliament.  
The great oecumenical councils of that period brought together clerics and 
laymen from all over western Christendom, they were the first European 
parliament. They deliberated, issued new laws and made the papal curia an 
organ of the Church and not its master. They embodied a progressive move 
against a centuries-old tradition. 
In the fourteenth century scholars like Marsilius of Padua had criticized the 
autocratic papal system and wanted the oecumenical council to be the sovereign 
legislator. They hoped for a transition from papal absolutism to a democratic 
conciliar constitution – a triumph for the ascending theory of power ix. This had 
been a pipedream for a long time, as defying the Vicar of Christ on earth seemed 
unrealistic. Yet, quite unexpectedly, the Great Western Schism (1387-1417) 
gave the lie to the pessimists. For three quarters of a century the popes, under 
French influence, had resided in Avignon, until under popular demand for the 
Roman pontiff to return to Rome, the cardinals in 1378 elected an Italian, Urban 
VI, who decided to move to Rome. But soon afterwards a caucus of French 
cardinals elected a French pope, Clement VII, who went to live in Avignon. 
Henceforth, both claiming legitimacy and excommunicating each other. 
Christianity was divided in two, as one half followed the pope of Rome and the 
other the pope of Avignon. This conflict at the top gave the conciliar movement 
a chance to put its ideas into practice and to convene a general council 
representing the whole of Christendom, to assume control, restore unity and 
reform the Church in depth. The autocratic papacy would be toppled, not by 
mass demonstrations but by a self-inflicted crisis at the top.  
The council of Pisa met in 1409 and was attended by numerous bishops, abbots, 
university dons and representatives of rulers and cities. It declared itself 
competent to solve the schism, deposed the two then popes, Benedict XIII and 
Gregory XII x, as schismatics and heretics, and elected their own pope, 
Alexander V. But, as the two deposed leaders rejected the legitimacy of the 
council, the Church was governed – or supposed to be – by three popes. The 
situation was so desperate that another general council was convened to put 
things right. This was the council of Constance (1414-1418), dominated by the 
progressive reformist party. It was the largest medieval assembly, attended by 
hundreds of prelates and princes, as well as some one hundred doctors of 
theology or law. The council decided to vote by nation and not by head 
(concilium constituitur ex nationibus), the Germans, Italians, French, English 
and Spaniards being predominant. They held committee meetings and plenary 
sessions. On 26 March and 6 April 1415 the council, to which the papal 
government was to be subordinate, claimed supreme authority. The schism was 
brought to an end by the election on 11 November 1417 of  Pope Martin V 
(1417-1431) by a body of cardinals and representatives of the leading nations. 
Constance was an exercise in democracy, turning the papal Church into the 
people’s Church . It was the supreme moment for the conciliar movement, for 
under Martin V the papal restauration was already under way. The next council, 
held at Basel (1431-1437/1449) ran into trouble as, in 1437, Pope Eugenius IV, 
elected in 1431 after Martin V’s death, decided to move to Ferrara , but was 
followed only by a minority, the others continuing in Basel. In 1439 they 
defined as dogma that the general council was supreme and that denying this  
amounted to heresy. Basel moreover deposed Pope Eugenius IV as a schismatic 
and heretic. However, lack of support by the crowned heads weakened the 
council, which petered out and came to an end in Lausanne in 1449. It had 
overreached itself: the election in 1439 of duke Amadeus of Savoy, a widower, 
as Pope Felix V (1439-1449) had been a desperate and even aberrant move, and 
the conservatives in the Church had not disarmed. At the “papal” council of 
Ferrara, soon transferred to Florence (1438-1442), the defenders of the age-old 
tradition gained the upper hand and restaured the papal supremacy. The 
descending theory of power triumphed, the abhorred decrees of Basel were 
annulled and their authors condemned as heretics and excommunicated. In 1442 
the council moved to Rome. The restauration had been supported by the book of 
the Spanish theologian and cardinal Juan de Torquemada, who had strongly 
condemned conciliarism in Basel and was papal adviser in Ferrara. 
The brief interlude of Pisa, Constance and Basel – a mere thirty years – seemed 
misguided, a deviation or even an aberration from a venerable tradition. The 
fourteenth-century pipedream had turned into a nightmare for the papacy, and 
Rome was determined that there would be no repetition. As recently as 1983 the 
Codex Iuris Canonici stipulated in canon 1372 that whoever appealed to an 
oecumenical council against an edict of the Roman pontiff should be punished. 
What is the modern reader to make of all this? He will sympathise with the 
attempt of the progressives to limit papal absolutism and give power to a 
broadly based assembly. The reformers, however, found that government by an 
assembly was impractical and the rulers withdrew their initial support when they 
came to distrust the democratic surge behind the conciliar movement. 
Some influential clerics, who had been active in Basel, went over to the papal 
side to find stability. Aenea Silvio Piccolomini, for example, had been a 
moderate conciliarist in Basel, for a while even supporting Felix V, but later 
turned his back on conciliarism, became a cardinal in 1456 and ended as Pope 
Pius II (1458-1464). He was one of the most prestigious old-style Church 
leaders and a humanist who built the Palazzo Piccolomini in Pienza, well known 
to tourists in Italy. 
The reformatio ecclesiae of the fifteenth century was the last major attempt to 
reform the Church from within, for the sixteenth-century Reformation broke up 
medieval Christendom xi. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Is the chain of events under review meaningful or was it just “one damn thing 
after another”, a “tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying 
nothing”? 
From a democratic point of view the European experience was admittedly not 
encouraging. Progressive endeavours have all too often been less than 
successful. In some cases the reformers have failed completely to reverse the 
existing autocratic order: the conciliar movement comes to mind. In other cases 
the rebellion against one oppressive regime led to another such regime, but 
inspired by a different ideology: the Puritan Revolution comes to mind. 
 In yet other instances the initial success of the liberal ideology was pushed to 
such extremes that State terrorism was the result: the French Revolution comes 
to mind. 
Sometimes partial success was obtained, when progressive policies were 
pursued by autocratic rulers, attached to their own political tradition: the 
Enlightened emperors and kings come to mind. 
Fortunately there was sometimes a completely successful outcome, when an 
autocracy retreated before progressive action: the English Glorious Revolution 
and resulting constitutional and parliamentarian government come to mind. 
To end on an even more optimistic note, it is clear that in the long run and in 
spite of many pitfalls (such as the twentieth-century dictatorships) progressive 
democratic and liberal aspirations have won the day: present-day Europe comes 
to mind. 
 
 
R.C. van Caenegem 
SUMMARY 
Progress and Tradition 
 
Reflecting on tension between progressives and traditionalists in present-day 
Egypt, the author surveys comparable conflicts in the European past. In 
nineteenth-century Britain and Belgium the struggle between liberals and 
conservatives dominated public life. In eighteenth-century France the 
progressive forces of the Enlightenment were for a long time in bitter conflict 
with the traditional defenders of King and Church, until the latter were defeated 
at the French Revolution. In seventeenth-century England the Puritan 
Revolution overthrew Stuart absolutism, which was a democratic move, but 
Cromwell then established his own fundamentalist Republic, which was 
illiberal. In the sixteenth century Humanists and Protestants were progressive 
and broke with medieval modes of thought and papal domination, but were 
opposed by traditional forces  around the House of Habsburg and the 
Counterreformation, neither party claiming total victory. By the fifteenth the 
progressive conciliar movement attempted to democratize the Catholic Church 
by putting the papal curia under the supreme authority of the general council, an 
assembly representing Christian people of all nations. This short-lived attempt 
was foiled by defenders of the traditional papal supremacy. 
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